Friday, February 28, 2020

Hospitality Management Major-Dining Room Operation Class-Memo 3 Essay

Hospitality Management Major-Dining Room Operation Class-Memo 3 - Essay Example One gets ready to attend to the guests and to serve their needs in a customized fashion. This calls for one to understand their guests and to comprehend what their needs are (Holmes, 12). The second part is the attribute of effecting merchandising. This is where one takes the order of the meals. One gets to interact with the guests and get what their orders of the day or the time are. What it is they feel like having at that point in time. The third part of a meal is the action of practically getting to serve the meal. This comes upon getting what the guests would like to have and hence it is done in a fashion that is befitting the desires of the guests at the point in time (Hall, and Schulz, 43). â€Å"Having the chef explain particular items is a good way for the service person to learn the menu† (Strianese and Strianese, 161). The service person needs to be at the beck and call of the guests and hence needs to master the menu. â€Å"Guests often inquire about terms on the menu† (Strianese and Strianese, 164). Finally the last part is getting to present the check to the gusts. This is where they get the breakdown of what the fiscal implications of their service was and they are required to foot their bill before making their

Wednesday, February 12, 2020

French Politics and Public Policy Case Study Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3000 words

French Politics and Public Policy - Case Study Example An examination of the theoretical and ideological apparatuses that precipitated this political shift along with a presentation of cultural and political events that led to a realignment of political strategies of the two parties will be followed by an inquiry into the organizational and leadership practices and beliefs of the two groups. The subsequent analysis of the ebb and flow of the respective fortunes of the PS and PCF should reveal that the Political Left in France has operated under a "Coalition as Rivalry"2 paradigm to the ultimate benefit of the PS and the seemingly irrecoverable detriment of the PCF. Forming out of the Section Francaise de I'lnternationale Ouvriere (SFIO) in 1905, the Socialist Party was cobbled together with an uneasy mix of Marxists, members of worker's parties, revolutionaries and reformists.3 The uneasiness of this arrangement eventually led to a splintering of the "feeble" alliance and at the 1920 Congress of Tour, what was to become the PCF was formed.4 The rather hard ideological line of the PCF illustrated by the slogan, "sovietization outrance" is indicative of the affiliation that French Communists had at the time with Soviet Politburo.5 The Socialists and Communists did briefly come together in an unofficial capacity, along with the radicals in a mid-1930's movement known as the Popular Front. That coalition was interrupted by WWII. After WWII, much of the left was united against Gaullism though nevertheless splintered over the issue of Algerian Independence. The start of the Fifth Republic saw perpetuation of the orthodox commitments of the Communist Party in France despite growing dissention among the ranks in the European left. These parties, including ones in Britain, Italy, and Hungary were experiencing a mass exodus of party faithful and a philosophical crisis of faith. The PCF however remained nominally loyal to their Leninist-Stalinist roots, exemplified by their indignation and recrimination of the "Khrushchev Thaw."6 The SFIO, beginning at the end of the Fourth Republic and continuing into the Fifth Republic, struggled to define itself ideologically between centrist factions and the committed PCF, and as such saw a steady decline through the 1950s and 1960s.7 Despite attempts by SFIO to form alliances and create coalitions with the Radicals and remaining non-Communist remnants of the Popular Front, 1969 saw electoral disaster when Gaston Defferre, the newly formed PS candidate for president received less than 5% of the electoral vote.8 The French Left overall suffered losses in the National Assembly throughout the first two post-war decades, representing 60% of the vote in 1945 to just under 40% in 1968. Figure 19 The primary issue for the Left and specifically for the Communists was motivating its constituents in the economically and politically stable milieu of Gaullist France.10 As one commentator described it, "What is certain is that the France of 1968 does not seem able to give itself the luxury of a political